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"He who admits on general grounds that the structure and habits of all 
animals have been gradually evolved, will look at the whole subject of 
Expression in a new and interesting light." 
Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals, 1872. 
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Abstract 
In my introductory chapter I briefly outline the present state of philosophical 
emotion theory. I state my position on the status and future of "folk psychology", 
and the future of traditional propositional attitude psychology. 
The next three chapters of the thesis expound and criticise some current theories of 
emotion. In chapter two I outline the prevalent "cognitivist" onhodoxy. I present a 
series of problems for this theory, and show how successive refinements to the 
theory have attempted to meet them. In the last section of the chapter I discuss the 
relationship between a cognitive taxonomy of emotions and the folk taxonomy. 
In chapter three I give an account of the philosophically neglected 
psychoevolutionary theory of emotions. I describe Darwin's remarkable work in 
this field, and compare it to the present state of play. In sections four and five of the 
chapter I outline an "affect-program" model of emotions, and connect it with current 
work in other areas of the philosophy of mind. 
In chapter four I discuss the constructionist theories of emotion which have been 
taken up in recent years by cenain philosophers. I criticise many of the current 
accounts of constructionism, and produce my own, substantially revised version, 
which I claim has been purged of many muddles, conflations, and controversial 
commitments. 
Chapter five defends the core contentions of the thesis. I argue that none of the 
three theories discussed are adequate accounts of the whole domain, and that each 
should only properly apply to cenain subdomains of emotional phenomena. I call 
this a "multi-vocal" theory of emotion, in contrast to the traditional insistence on 
univocal theories. Univocal theories, I argue, are merely Procrustean. 
X 
In chapter six I provide a cognate account of of emotion attribution, stressing the 
diversity of modes of attribution that corresponds to the diversity of "emotional" 
phenomena. 
Chapter seven provides a theory of mood and trait phenomena. Although 
independently motivated, the theory turns out to dovetail neatly with my account of 
affect -program states. 
The appendices deal with matters referred to in the thesis, but which would 
interrupt the flow of my argument if included in the main body of the text. 
Appendix I gives details of experiments referred to in chapter three. Appendix II 
defends the uses of sociobiology suggested in chapter five. Appendix three gives a 
theory of sensations referred to in chapter six and elsewhere. 
Format of the Thesis 
I have used tltree levels of headings. First, the thesis is divided into chapters, 
numbered with Arabic numerals 1-7. Next, each chapter is divided into 
subsections numbered decimally, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc. Finally, simple underlined 
heads, such as that used to introduce this paragraph, are inserted at various points 
to aid the exposition. These are not listed in the table of contents, or used for cross-
referencing. 
Appendices to the thesis are numbered with Roman numerals, I-ill. They are 
divided into decimally numbered sub-sections, I.I. I.II, etc, in a manner analogous 
to the chapters. Each appendix is linked to the particular chapter where the 
questions it deals with are most frequently referred to. 
XI 
Figures and tables are also numbered decimally. Figures in chapters are labeled 
Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, etc. Tables in Appendix I are labeled Table I.I, Table I.II, 
etc. 
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